Lessons from Korean development experience by Khan, Haider A.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Lessons from Korean development
experience
Haider A. Khan
University of Denver
July 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39387/
MPRA Paper No. 39387, posted 6. July 2012 22:26 UTC
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lessons from Korean Development Experience 
 
 
 
 
Haider A. Khan 
Joseph Korbel School of International Studies 
University of Denver 
Denver, CO 80208 
hkhan@du.edu 
 
July 2011 
 
Invited Paper for the 2011 United Nations Academic Impact 
Forum, Seoul, August 9-12, 2011 
 
 2 
Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the possibilities of learning from Korea 
some pertinent lessons for industrialization and development in the 21st century.  The 
21st century presents an even greater challenge for industrialization in the developing 
world than the post-WWII period. The changed global economic and ecological 
environment will shape the emergence of new technological and industrial paradigms 
and trajectories in significant ways. However, the experience of Korea still presents 
many relevant lessons. The paper uses an extension of Sen's idea of capabilities within 
a framework of complex dynamic systems.  In this view, development is really an 
extension over time and space of freedom, particularly the positive freedom to lead a 
certain type of life an individual has reasons to value through the creation of an 
interlinked network of institutions. I discuss a number of strategic features of Korean 
development experience ranging from strategic openness to learning, innovation and 
ultimately, enhancing the standard of living for all. From the Korean case, it is apparent 
that the desirable institutions provide a rough and ready type of security of property 
rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and strategically conceived 
integration with the world economy. In addition, they also help maintain 
macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance. Over 
time and given sufficient financial development, the state and private sector institutions 
should be able to manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries. In order to promote 
equitable growth there will also need to be institutions that can supply social insurance 
and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability. But there is 
no one-size-that-fits-all for any of these functions. I also argue that in addition to the 
positive lessons from the Korean experience and the willingness of Korea to extend aid 
and expertise to developing economies of Asia and Africa in particular, Korea can also 
play a much broader and significant role in the present turbulent global political 
economy through creative regional and global cooperation. 
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the possibilities of learning from Korea 
some pertinent lessons for industrialization and development in the 21st century.  The 
21st century presents an even greater challenge for industrialization in the developing 
world than the post-WWII period. The changed global economic and ecological 
environment will shape the emergence of new technological and industrial paradigms 
and trajectories in significant ways (Dosi 2000, Khan 2004a). However, the experience 
of Korea still presents many relevant lessons. Therefore, the next section focuses on the 
development and industrialization experiences of Korea in order to bring out a number 
of still relevant insights.  The strategy of my paper is to both avoid the danger of falling 
into overgeneralization and to emphasize the need for some changes in both the global 
economic environment and specific development and industrialization strategies. This 
is highlighted in section 2 of this paper where the outlines of  an alternative 
development strategy are given. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that even during the post-WWII period , as some have 
pointed out (e.g.,Amsden(2008), , Jomo(2007,2001,1995), Khan (2004a,b; 1997), there 
were at least two sub-periods. The first was an era of relative optimism during the 
Bretton Woods period of managed global capitalism. During this era, there was an 
overall strategy of development in the capitalist bloc that relied to a large extent on 
state-market synergy. It delivered fairly high growth for at least two decades in many 
countries but the distributional record was not impressive. Most importantly, the East 
Asian miracle with high growth and relatively benign distributional record throughout 
the entire post-WWII period(except the post-1990 record of Korea) also had its 
beginning during this era. Much of the infrastructural and human resources foundations 
 4 
for the subsequent growth and industrialization in the four tigers--- and in retrospect, 
for Korea and India--- were laid during these two decades. 
 
The second period---now that much of the smoke from the last thirty years has cleared--
- can be seen now as the demise of the Bretton Woods international financial 
architecture without any firm replacement except a dollar hegemony which now looks 
increasingly shaky. It is also seen as the era of Washington consensus which promised 
much but has delivered so far very little in the way of growth, investment and 
employment. Admittedly, both the periods were complex and a nuanced history is yet 
to be written; but the contrast is there. The rise of the Asian tigers including Korea and 
to some extent India has to be seen against this background. In this paper, the main 
argument regarding sustainable industrialization and development in this century is 
based on the idea of a complex economic system. The main conclusion is that while 
industrialization is both necessary and possible, a reasonable strategy must take into 
account the unevenness and complexity of the global economic system. Given that the 
developing countries themselves are at several different stages of development, there is 
no one-size-fits-all set of prescriptions. However, a nuanced and context-sensitive 
approach based on a realistic theory of development can still offer much help. This is 
where the Korean experience, I will argue, still has much to teach us. 
 
Writing in 1926, in a biographical essay on Edgeworth, Keynes underlined some of the 
problems of complex human systems: 
 
We are faced at every turn with problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of 
discontinuity--- the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity 
fail us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and 
homogeneous continuum are not satisfied.1 
 
If anything, the developing part of the world economy today shows to even a greater 
degree the kind of complexity captured in Keynes’s words above. Fortunately, systems 
theory and economic theory have both made some progress since those dark days. 
Although we are far from a genuinely complete theory of complex economic systems, 
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efforts are underway that have already borne some interesting fruit in several limited 
areas.2 There are many facets of complex developing economies --each with its own 
sub-systemic characteristics to be sure, but there are also some common strategic 
features. The purpose of this paper  is to partly synthesize from a strategic perspective--
- to the extent it is possible to do so--- the development experiences of mainly the Asian 
economies with references to others( particularly the BRICs as a group and the Least 
Developed Coutries---the LDCs--- by way of contrast) and draw some appropriate 
lessons for industrialization and development in the 21st century.. 
 
2. Defining Development and Stages of Development and Some Common 
Strategic Features 
 
However, at this point some clarification of the key term "development" is necessary in 
order to avoid ambiguities and confusions. In the rest of this paper, I will be referring to 
three concepts of development that are implicit in much of the  discussion in the field of 
industrialization and development. The first is the idea of development as growth with 
some structural change or at least the idea that this type of growth is the most crucial 
necessary condition for development. The second concept is derived by adding explicit 
distributional elements to growth--- particularly inequality and poverty. Both these 
ideas are shared by the development economists today ---at least implicitly. In a recent 
contribution,  Peter Warr is explicit in discussing all three---growth, absolute poverty 
and inequality3--- and his thoughtful essay alerts the reader to the performance of 
Thailand in all three areas and derives--- at least partly---  a logic of further necessary 
reforms following from his cogent analysis of the three aspects of development in this 
sense. .  He concludes: 
 
 
                                                            
1 Keynes(1971-9), Vol. X, p. 261 
2 See for example, Khan(2004a,b, 2003a,, 1998,1997) and the references therein. 
3 At least since the McNamara period in the 70s, the World Bank took the lead in advocating 
“redistribution with growth”. ILO and UNCTAD also followed suit and had stronger lines of argument. 
Sen did his earlier work on poverty in the 70s  under ILO sponsorship. UNIDO and ECLAC both had  
always advocated industrialization and equity. 
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Not all aspects of the Thai development strategy have been similarly successful. 
Inequality has increased at the same time as absolute poverty has declined. The 
underlying causes of this increase in inequality are still not well understood. (Warr 
2008, p.22)4 
 
The third--- and the broadest approach to development discussed here--- is in terms of 
Sen's idea of capabilities and its further extensions. In this view, development is really 
an extension over time and space of freedom,particularly the positive freedom to lead a 
certain type of life an individual has reasons to value. In technical modeling of 
industrialization and development (including my own models---see appendixes) often 
this normative view is not adopted explicitly. Yet, in so far as there is a normative 
aspect about development being a "(public) good" that is a premise for the whole 
project of industrialization and development such a view is consistent with the 
modeling approaches as well. In a recent essay prepared for WIDER, a Korean scholar 
Keun Lee's perceptive comments on the possible role of democracy in development 
extends considerably the terrain of discussion in the direction of the "development as 
freedom" perspective when he writes: 
We see obvious advantages in democracy, amongst which is the convenient feature that 
citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest and torture. Truly strong states get it wrong 
more often than they get it right. Thus the military dictatorships of Latin America left 
little in the way of legacy ,whereas the military dictatorships in Korea and Taiwan 
(while not on anything like the same scale of brutality) left a powerful legacy of 
development. The difference lies clearly in strategic orientation and in institutional 
capacity in formulating and implementing a program of national industrial 
development. Our point is that this is an option available to the political leadership of 
any developing country today. On top of this, the key to the Korean or Asian success 
was institutional longevity. (Lee 2008, p. 13) 
  
It would seem, therefore, that there is an implicit agreement in at least the post-1970 
thinking  that development is "growth plus" other things. While the list of "other 
things" may vary somewhat, none of the researchers in the field today would equate 
growth and development. Yet,  almost  all would agree that generating high growth 
may be a useful means towards development. Many thoughtful researchers  also pay 
some attention to what can be called "the political economy of growth and distribution" 
                     
4 See also Warr(1993,1999,2005) for nuanced analyses of the various aspects of Thailand's development 
experience and Jomo(2007,1995)  for Malaysia.. 
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Synthesizing the Experiences of the high growth Asian economies and the Korean 
economy in particular further reveals some common strategic orientations as well as the 
effects of changes in external environment and shifts in policies over time. This is 
consistent with the characteristics of complex economic systems which are nonlinear 
with multiple equilibria and path dependence. Over time, one may observe the 
emergence of structural shifts in some cases, stagnation in other cases depending on 
initial conditions, strategies, policies and external environment among other things.In 
the Asian cases discussed here, there are many specific variations within each. 
However, they also share to various degrees many specific features listed below. 
 
1. Strategic Openness of the Korean strategy: 
One important feature of the Korean strategy was a strategic commitment to export 
promotion beyond an earlier period of strategic import substitution(SISI)5 and further 
goals of moving up the value added ladder. It should be kept in mind however, that 
there can be a "fallacy of composition"(Cline1982, Khan 1983,Mayer 2002, Razmi and 
Blecker 2006) in claiming that all developing countries need to do is to pursue an 
export-led growth policy. Reciprocal demands may not exist sufficiently and the 
ensuing competition for export markets in developed countries may create winners as 
well as losers. Therefore, what may be needed in the future for other aspiring countries 
is a strategic approach including the development of national and regional markets and 
the creation of dynamic comparative advantage along with a number of other policies 
and institution building processes described below. In Asia, Korea and other East Asian 
successful countries can play a significant enabling role in this respect in the future. 
2. Heterodox macroeconomic policies for stability6---Here  Korea has   displayed 
more of a mix of heterodox policies than the standard Washington consensus. For a 
long time capital markets were not liberalized. Trade policy, on the other hand, was 
more liberal; but here, too, it was combined with industrial policies(Chang 2007) It 
                     
5 On what I have called SISI, see Amsden(2008) and the references therein, 
Bruton(1998)Khan(2004a,b;1997,1985,1982a,b)  
  
6 See Jomo and Nagaraj(2001) for a good discussion of heterodoxy in this context. 
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seems that the rigidity  of Washington consensus particularly in this area is rejected by 
the experiences of developing economies like Korea.  
3. Creation of institutions for productive investment--- Korea seems to have gone 
much further than even the other successful East Asian countries much earlier.Starting 
with the reforms in the 1960s, it moved through several successive stages and is now 
trying to find appropriate technological niche in a world that is moving towards a 
convergence of information, bio and nano technologies by 2050. The role of state in the 
creation of these institutions is still very prominent. 
4. Agricultural development---  Korea and Taiwan had an egalitarian land reform 
after the end of Japanese colonialism. Although, the agricultural policies underwent 
some swings in Korea, until the WTO regime an emphasis on helping the small farmers 
was quite notable. Technological change in agriculture in both Korea and Taiwan has 
been quite impressive. 
 
 
5. Industrial development and structural change-- the strategic perspective in this 
important area suggests that the successful countries to various degrees pursued a 
continuously unfolding and dynamic set of policies with much trial and error. The 
retrospective attempts to tell a coherent story have often led to an overly deductive 
picture where good performances supposedly follow from a few , usually neoclassical 
economic principles. The Korean  case studies by Amsden and Khan show the comp-
lexity of the challenges and the trial and error responses by the policy makers over 
several decades. Amsden(1989, 2008), Khan(1982a,b;1983,1997,2004a,b) and 
Wade(1990) discuss the cases of Korea and Taiwan in the general East Asian context. 
 
6. Creation of technological capabilities--- here the Korean case stands out as a very 
apt illustration of creating technological capabilities throughout the entire growth and 
development trajectory in definite stages.7  
 As Lee(2008,pp.4-5) points out: 
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Among various aspects of capacities, emphasis should be on technological capabilities 
because without these, sustained growth is impossible. In this era of open market 
competition, private companies cannot sustain growth if they rely upon cheap products; 
they need to be able to move up the value-chain to higher-value added goods based on 
continued upgrading and improvement and technological innovation. Furthermore, 
private companies had better be “local” companies, whenever possible, including 
locally controlled JVs, not foreign controlled subsidiaries of the MNCs. MNCs 
subsidiaries are always moving around the world seeking cheaper wages and bigger 
markets.  Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to generate sustained growth in specific 
localities or countries although they can serve as useful channels for knowledge transfer 
and learning. 
 
7. Technological learning and innovation--- creating national innovation systems in 
particular requires the creation of specific institutions and technological learning over 
time. Ultimately, if development is to continue beyond the catching up phase, this may 
present the most crucial set of policy challenges. Here, the paper on Korea by 
Lee(2008) is an admirable attempt to sum up the lessons. There are specific features 
here to which Lee(2008,p.5) draws our attention. 
Therefore, while the ultimate goal and criterion of development is to raise the 
capabilities of local private companies, the process needs pilot agencies to guide and 
coordinate the whole process. Such needs exist because key resources are so scarce, 
and thus had better… be mobilized for uses in sectors or projects with greatest 
externalities. As understood by Gerschenkron, who analyzed the latecomer 
industrialization of Germany and Russia, and identified latecomer agencies, such as 
large state-owned investment banks to drive the process in these countries, it is such 
agencies that can make up for gaps or lacunae in the country that is seeking to 
industrialize. All the East Asian countries built specific state-agencies that played a role 
of guiding the process of industrialization. In Korea the institutions established in the 
1960s under the Park regime included the Economic Planning Board to set economic 
plans; the Ministry of Trade and Industry to support industrial policy and export; and 
the Ministry of Finance to finance economic plans.  
 
 Both state and civil society have to play important roles. At an earlier stage, the state 
necessarily plays a  large and activist role . At a later stage, however, the creation of 
technological capability has to rely on a private-public partnership at both the 
precompetitive and the competitive phases of innovation(Khan 1998,2004a, 2010). 
                                                            
7 See also Lee(2006) for a contrast of Korean experience with the Washington consensus and  
Khan(2008, 2002,1998 and 1997) for a discussion of the Korean  ( and Taiwanese)case(s) in the context 
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8. Direct Foreign Investment and Foreign Aid--- these factors have played a role for 
Korea. Investment from abroad has perhaps been more significant than aid per se. 
However, internal generation of investible funds and public sector support have also 
played a crucial role. 
 
9. Poverty reduction strategies-- these are a varied set of policies that are necessary in 
addition to growth. Although growth is a very important component of  such a strategic 
approach to poverty reduction, in all cases specific policies targeting both rural and 
urban poverty were undertaken. This suggests a "growth plus…"(Weiss and Khan2006) 
strategy for development. 
In addition to the nine sets of factors discussed above, there are also somewhat random, 
historically contingent factors.Khan’s case study on Korea acknowledges the presence 
of such factors explicitly and reveals historically contingent events ranging from 
momentous events such as wars and revolutions to more usual changes in domestic and 
international political factors and changes in policies that depended on crucial 
personalities such as that of President Park in Korea in the 1960s.  
What follows from the above identification of both the relatively necessary as well as 
the more contingent factors that have played a role is, I think, the need for taking a 
pragmatic and diagnostic approach to the problems of development and 
industrialization in the 21st century. It is necessary to identify distortions. It is also 
equally necessary to identify market failures and other institutional failures. Instead of 
taking a grand, presumptive approach to development, the role of a mix of heterodox 
policies with the willingness to revise policies before the cost gets too high seems to be 
the best recipe for avoiding failures. This has been the Korean experience including its 
response to the disastrous Asian Financial Crisis which in the Korean case was 
significantly affected by hasty financial market liberalization inter alia.8  
 
                                                            
of a distributionally sensitive growth model for positive feedback loop innovation system(POLIS).  
8 Both the positive and negative experiences over time of Korean development suggests strongly a non-
Washington consensus type pragmatic policies and institution building package geared to local history 
and culture for the LDCs in particular. For a fairly comprehensive analysis, see Khan(2009, 2011d). 
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In looking at institution building in the Korean case, it is also clear that generally, it is 
easier to list the functions that good institutions perform than it is to describe the shape 
they should take. In fact, consistent with the complexity approach outlined here, there 
may be a wide variety of institutions serving roughly the same function. From the 
Korean case, it is apparent that the desirable institutions provide a rough and ready type 
of security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and 
strategically conceived integration with the world economy. In addition, they also help 
maintain macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance. 
Over time and given sufficient financial development, the state and private sector 
institutions should be able to manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries. In order to 
promote equitable growth there will also need to be institutions that can supply social 
insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability. 
But there is no one-size-that-fits-all for any of these functions.9 
 
To sum up, the Korean case offers a set of concrete examples of the growth and 
development experiences during the post WWII period. Although no country can 
succeed by following mechanically the experience of another country , as outlined 
above, a number of helpful policy and institutional insights can still be drawn out from 
these cases. In the spirit of experimentation with rapid feedback and flexible policy 
making informed by a strategic medium to  long run perspective, much can be done by 
the policy makers who are imaginative and pragmatic at the same time. Dynamic 
learning and flexible institution building are essential components of such a strategic 
approach to development. I now discuss the somewhat changed economic environment 
in the post cold war period and outline the need for some specific changes which Korea 
and other East Asian economies as well as BRICS can help bring about . This, in 
addition, to the lessons outlined above can be the most optimal way for Korea to help 
today’s struggling developing economies. 
. 
 
 
                     
9 See Chang (2007) for a number of thoughtful contributions on this topic among other things. 
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3. Conclusions---How Korean Model can be used  today: Making 
Globalization Work towards Sustainable Industrialization and 
Development in the 21st century 
 
From the discussion so far it is clear that Korean development experience holds a 
number of lessons for other countries. From strategic openness to growth and 
innovation, there is much to learn from Korea. This is consistent with my nuanced 
position that for each developing country its own history and institutional specificities 
must also be taken into account. Also in keeping withmy complex systems approach, 
perhaps the most significant areas in the Korean development experience to focus on 
are self-organization of both markets and government and their complex interactions 
with much social learning. 
 
 In addition to the positive lessons from the Korean experience and the willingness of 
Korea to extend aid and expertise to developing economies of Africa in particular, Korea 
can also play a much broader and significant role in the present turbulent global political 
economy. The critical discussion of both the Korean development experience and the 
financial and innovation systems in particular (Khan 2004a, 2010, 2011a,b,c) leads to 
two conclusions among other things. The first is that under the first phase of the US 
hegemony, frontline states like Korea benefited from an external environment that is no 
longer the same  and will be impossible to replicate under the current rules of the game 
instituted by the US and other developed countries. Therefore, the current rules of 
globalization must change. The second conclusion is that even if these rules change and 
some other countries can move forward on the path of industrialization, the older 20th 
century modes of industrialization based on fossil fuel based technology will not be 
sustainable. As Khan(2009) demonstrates, even for Korea the current strategy of 
development and patterns of energy consumption are unsustainable. In this particular 
work reported in Khan(2009) , I have sketched the energy dilemma for Korea in this 
century. As long as the current geopolitical situation persists, the pursuit of present 
development strategy of Korea will further increase its energy dependence. For both 
political and economic reasons, Korea needs to rethink its development strategy. In my 
earlier work on Korean energy security I have sketched such an alternative strategy that 
relies much less on fossil fuels and emphasizes regional cooperation. Korean 
innovation system strategy also recognizes and strives for a more ecologically sound 
and socially inclusive system. Thus Korea can set a positive example here through both 
domestic practice and regional cooperation efforts. 
 
 
 
Khan et. al.(forthcoming) shows this for the BRICS as a group also. This paper 
investigates the relation between rapid economic growth and environmental 
degradation in the BRIC economies. It utilizes environmental, macroeconomic and 
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financial variables coupled with Kyoto Protocol indicators based on panel data from 
1992 to 2004.In keeping with the goal of examining long run sustainability, the long-
run equilibrium relationship between economic growth and energy consumption is 
examined. Feasible general least squares procedure (FGLS) is employed to estimate 
the environmental degradation caused by increases in energy consumption. Pooled 
regression analysis is used to estimate the relationship between energy consumption 
and growth variables. The impact of excessive economic growth rates on energy 
consumption levels is studied by means of threshold pooled ordinary least squares 
(POLS) method. Moreover, this analysis takes into account the legitimate econometric 
criticism of the Environmental Kuznets Curve highlighted by Stern (2004). The 
findings reveal that higher energy consumption leads to increased CO2 emissions in the 
countries under consideration.It is also found that rapid economic growth further 
inflates energy consumption levels in the emerging BRIC economies. The results of 
cointegration analyses also confirm these findings. Finally, the inclusion of the US and 
Japan as the world’s largest energy consumers does not significantly alter the results of 
our study. Korea can also set an example for the larger BRIC economies and work with 
them towards an ecologically sustainable development strategy for all. 
 
One of the most important changes in globalization must be the creation of a new 
global financial architecture that will play more of an enabling role than the current 
chaotic international financial system. Khan (2004b, 2011a,b) discussed this issue 
extensively and has suggested a hybrid type of structure. For the foreseeable future a 
hybrid financial architecture combining regional financial arrangements with a 
reformed IMF may be the best hope for global financial stability and development. In 
my work in this area, I have shown how IMF must and can change in a direction which 
allows for greater national policy autonomy for development . I have also shown that 
the IMF needs complementary regional institutions of cooperation in order to create a 
stabilizing hybrid global  financial architecture that will be more democratic and pro-
development in terms of its governance structure and behavior. Thus regional financial 
architectures will need to be integral parts of any new global financial architecture 
(GFA).The tentative steps taken towards regional cooperation in Asia since Asian 
financial crisis illustrate the opportunities and challenges posed by the need to evolve 
towards a hybrid GFA. Here Korea has learned much from its own experience and is 
playing a constructive and enabling role in the ASEAN+ 3 arrangements. Undoubtedly, 
in the future the economic diplomacy of Korea can help a great deal in moving the 
global and regional institutions towards a pro-development structure. This will be a 
truly visionary yet practical goal for Korean government in the international  arena. 
 
I would like to end by reminding us of the heroic sacrifices made by the Korean people 
for their freedom and prosperity. The great Korean poet Kim Chiha wrote from prison: 
 
Oh! If a morning glory and sunbeam rested 
On my bright tear-brimming eyes 
That have through the dark night waited  
For the dawn with a gut-wrenching pain 
What a blessing it would be! 
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Thanks to the struggles of all the freedom-loving Koreans, the country has achieved 
both democracy and prosperity. If in the future Korea can effect a true synthesis of 
individual freedom with responsibility towards the larger community, it will not only 
have achieved the blessing that Kim’s heartfelt poem mentions, but it will also set a 
tremendous example for rest of the world as well. 
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Appendix 1: 
 
 A ‘Simple’ Non-linear Model of Complexity, Growth, Distribution and 
Innovation System Motivated by the Korean Experience 
  
 In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing complex 
technological systems motivated by the above case study of Korea in particular, we 
summarize here the basic structure of a ‘simple’ non-linear model embodying distinct 
technological systems which can be applied to analyze the technological trajectories in 
countries like Korea. At any single point in time, the model can be presented as a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) representation of the socio-economic system.  The key 
distinction here is the explicitly non-linear nature of the economy-wide functional 
relationships. The key theorem shows the existence of multiple equilibria. Some further 
considerations of complexity and increasing returns show that multiple equilibria are 
indeed the natural outcomes in such models. Thus, there would seem to be some role 
for domestic policy in guiding the economy to a particular equilibrium among many. 
 
 The virtue of an economy-wide approach to technology systems is the 
embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages.  In a SAM, such linkages are mappings 
from one set of accounts to another. In terms of technology systems, the production 
activities can be broken down into a production (sub-) system and a set of innovative 
activities. In practice, this presents considerable difficulties of classification and 
empirical estimation. 
 
 One major component of the entire innovation system is, of course, the 
expenditures on R&D.  In the SAM for Korea used here, this can appear either as an 
aggregate expenditure along the column labeled R&D, or as a set of disaggregated 
expenditures.1  In the latter case these may be specified according to productive 
activities (e.g., construction, electrical equipment, etc.) or by institutions (e.g., private 
R&D expenditures, government R&D expenditures, etc.).  It should be emphasized that 
the dynamic effects of R&D on the economy can be captured only in a series of such 
SAMs over time.  This approach is still at the conceptual stage, but appears to be quite 
appealing.  One can contrast the possible policy experiments that can be undertaken 
within such a framework with the apparently ad hoc science and technology policies in 
many developing countries. In particular, the impact over time of many economic 
development policies including innovation policies can be traced by building and 
maintaining such SAMs. 
 
 Choice of new technology in a developing country is affected by research and 
development in at least three different ways. Such a country can attempt to develop 
new technology through R&D, as mentioned previously.  This ultimately requires a 
positive feedback loop innovation system in order to be self-sustaining.  Another 
alternative is to adapt existing technology. This too requires a production system geared 
towards innovation in a limited way. A third alternative is to import technology or to 
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acquire it through attracting foreign direct investment. In practice, all these different 
forms may be combined. The abstract model embodies all these different possibilities. 
However, the first option requires, among other things, a presence of multiple 
equilibria. In a unique equilibrium world the competitive equilibrium (under the 
assumption of complete markets) will always be the most efficient one. The presence of 
increasing returns usually destroys such competitive conditions.  
 
 We begin with a number of productive activities reflecting the existing 
technological structure. These activities are defined on the input-output subspace of the 
general and abstract mathematical space X. In addition to the values of inputs and 
outputs, points in this space could also represent household and other institutional 
income and expenditure accounts. We also incorporate the possibility of R&D as a 
separate productive activity. Formally, it is always possible to break R&D down into as 
many finite components as we want. The key relationship in this context is that 
between the endogenous accounts (usually, production activities and technologies, 
factors and households) and the exogenous ones.  It is this relationship that is posited to 
be non-linear and this together with some assumptions on the relevant mathematical 
space can lead to the existence of multiple equilibria. 
  
Although the existence theorems for these multisectoral models provide some structure 
for the equilibria as sequences of fixed points in the socio-economic structure with 
evolving technology systems, it is not specified a priori which equilibrium will be 
reached. The problem of equilibrium selection thus remains open. The idea behind a 
POLIS can now be stated somewhat more formally. It is to reach a sequence of 
equilibria so that in the non-linear models of the entire economy the maximal fixed 
points that are attainable are in fact reached through a combination of market forces and 
policy maneuvers over time. It is also to be understood that path-dependence of 
technology would rule out certain equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of 
technologies can matter crucially at times. 
 
 The Model on a Lattice 
 
 Define X  as a vector lattice over a subring M  of the real field R .Let 
{ }0,| !"=+ xXxxx  
A non-linear mapping N  is defined such that 0,: 0 =! ++ NXXN .  Given a vector of 
exogenous variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a simultaneous 
non-linear equations model of an economy, :E  
dNxx +=           (1) 
for a given +! Xd . 
This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described 
previously.  In order to specify the model further, the following assumptions are 
necessary.  
1. X  is order complete 
2. N  is an isotone mapping 
3.   !"xˆ  such that dxNx +! ˆˆ     
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In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of 
inputs to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical 
progress over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary for the existence of 
equilibrium. Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is some level of output 
vector which can be produced given the technical production conditions and demand 
structure. 
 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria:  
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists +! Xx
*  so that *x  is a solution 
of  
dNxx +=  
 Proof: Consider the interval [ ] { }xxXxxx !!"= + ˆ0,ˆ|ˆ,0  where xˆ  is defined as in 
assumption 3.  Take a mapping F . 
dNxXxF +!" +:  
F  is isotone and maps [ ]x,0  into itself. 
Define a set [ ]{ }FxxxxxD !"# ,,0 . 
By assumption 3, D  is non-empty. 
We now show Dx inf* !  is a solution to dNxx += . Dx inf* ! ; therefore 
Dxxx !"# ,* . F  is isotone; therefore xFxFx !!*  for each Dx!  implying. 
 ** xFx !  
From (2) we have ( ) ** FxFxF ! . Thus DFx !* ; hence ** inf FxDx !"  so, 
*** FxxFx !! . Therefore ** Fxx = . 
This is an application of Tarski’s and Birkhoff’s theorem.  The key feature to note here 
is that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted that under 
additional assumptions on space X  and the mapping N  the computation of a fixed 
point can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt). A similar model 
can be constructed on Banach space as well. 
 
Needless to say, any formalization of a complex system leaves out certain 
features. For example, the political features of POLIS are captured only indirectly and 
inferentially in the above model. But at least the ecological and distributive features can 
be captured by constructing the appropriate environmentally-sensitive SAMs and 
applying the model over time for a country like Korea. What the above verbal argument 
and formal exercise suggest is the feasibility of an alternative developmental model that 
builds upon some of the insights of the Asian success stories like Korea but also can 
take some necessary steps to face the ecological and political economic challenges of 
the 21st  century. 
 
 
Appendix 2: The Augmented National Innovation Systems approach and a more 
complex illustrative model 
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 Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space for an Augmented National 
Innovation Systems model:   
 
 In this section the results for multiple equilibria presented verbally in the main 
text and formally in appendix 1 are further extended to functionals on Banach 
Space. We can define the model presented in appendix 1 again for monotone 
iterations, this time on a non-empty subset of an ordered Banach space X . The 
mapping XXf !:  is called compact if it is continuous and if ( )xf  is relatively 
compact.  The map f  is called completely continuous if f  is continuous and maps 
bounded subsets of X  into compact sets.  Let X  be a non-empty subset of some 
ordered set Y .  A fixed point x  of a map XXN !: is called minimal (maximal) 
if every fixed point y  of N  in X  satisfies 
 ( )xyyx !!  
Theorem: Let ( )PE, be an ordered Banach space and let D  be a subset of E .   
Suppose that EDf !:  is an increasing map which is compact on every order interval 
in D . If there exist ,y  Dy!ˆ with yy ˆ!  such that ( )yfy ! and ( ) yyf ˆˆ ! , then f  
has a minimal fixed point x .  Moreover, yx !  and ( )yFx klim= . That is, the 
minimal fixed point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration scheme 
 yx =0  
 ( )kk xfx =+1   ,....2,1,0=k  
Moreover, the sequence ( )kx  is increasing. 
Proof: Since f  is increasing, the hypotheses imply that f  maps the order interval 
[ ]yy,  into itself.  Consequently, the sequence ( )kx  is well-defined and, since it is 
contained in [ ]yyf , , it is relatively compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  By 
induction, it is easily seen that the sequence ( )kx  is increasing.  This implies that it has 
exactly one limit point x  and that the whole sequence converges to x . Since ƒ is 
continuous, x  is a fixed point of f .  If x  is an arbitrary fixed point in D  such that 
yx ! , then, by replacing y  by x  in the above argument, it follows that xx ! . Hence 
x  is the minimal fixed point of f  in ( ) DPy !+ .  It should be observed that we do 
not claim that there exists a minimal fixed point of f  in D . 
We can also show that if dNxXxF +!" +:  is an intersecting compact map 
in a non-empty order interval  [ ]xx ˆ,  and Fxx !  and xxF ˆˆ !  then F  has a minimal 
fixed point *x  and a maximal fixed point **x .  Moreover, ( )xFx klim* =  and 
( )xFx k ˆlim** = . The first of the above sequences is increasing and the second is 
decreasing. 
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